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not sound the death knell to the spendthrift provision; rather, it is
probably more accurate to interpret it as being a monument to poor
draftsmanship. The spendthrift clause in that case simply did not go far
enough - the clause stated that a beneficiary could not voluntarily alien-
ate his interest, but provided no discretionary or forfeiture clause if the
alienation was, in fact, accomplished. So it would appear that a well
drafted spendthrift provision is still valid in Ohio. But will such a
spendthrift clause have adverse tax effects on the marital deduction? It
is dear from the regulations that a spendthrift provision will not disqual-
ify a trust from the marital deduction; but a provision authorizing any per-
son other than the surviving spouse to deprive her of her right to income
will disqualify the trust for the marital deduction.4" And to have an ef-
fective spendthrift provision in Ohio, if indeed you can have one at all,
would require that a person, other than the surviving spouse, must have
discretionary authority over income if it is not to be subject to the claims
of creditors. Thus, the type of spendthrift clause that will effect a satis-
factory solution as to claims of creditors may have the unhappy effect of
disqualifying a trust for the marital deduction.
III
"PECUNIARY FORMULA" MARITAL DEDUCTION BEQUESTS:
APPLICATION OF REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
Norman A. Sugarman*
BACKGROUND
One of the most important and controversial developments in the
federal estate tax in recent years cumulated in the issuance of Revenue
Procedure 64-19' Although designed to resolve a highly imaportant
technical problem, the implications and controversy over the application
of Rev Proc. 64-19 are likely to exist for many years. This develop-
ment rivals the 1948 enactment of the marital deduction itself in rais-
ing the question whether lawyers should re-examine all wills and trusts
to determine whether they qualify for the marital deduction benefits
Congress granted under the federal estate tax.
Nature of the Problem
In brief, Rev Proc. 64-19 holds that a form of pecuniary formula
marital deduction bequest that apparently has been widely used does
45. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (7) (1958).
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not, m the view of the Internal Revenue Service, qualify for the marital
deduction. The Rev Proc. does provide a method of correction for
instruments executed prior to October 1, 1964, whereby upon the execu-
tion of additional agreements interpreting the otherwise condemned
marital deduction clause, the Service will allow the marital deduction.
However, this method is also not without its problems; and in any
event it leaves open to the lawyer the problem of what should be done
with regard to the drafting of new instruments where the marital deduc-
tion is desired.
The problem to which Rev Proc. 64-19 is directed arises in connec-
tion with both bequests and transfers in trusts where the document con-
tains a "pecuniary formula" marital deduction gift. For convenience
the problem to be discussed will be referred to in terms of bequests, al-
though the reader should understand that the same problem and con-
siderations apply to any transfer in trust which falls into the gross estate,
where the trust instrument contains a pecuniary formula marital deduction
clause.2
The genesis and nature of the problem may be illustrated by the
following hypothetical example. Assume the potential estate picture is
that shown in columns (A) and (B) below when the lawyer is called
upon to draft a marital deduction clause.
(A) (B) (C)
Estate Tax Value at Date
Gross Estate Value of Distributton
Cash ------------------ $100,000 ---
Stock X --------------- $500,000 $800,000
Stock Y --------------- $500,000 $400,000
Debts and administrative
expenses ------------- $100,000
In this situation, the lawyer may desire or be instructed to draft a marital
deduction clause to accomplish the following:
(1) To secure the maximum marital deduction, an amount equal
to $500,000.
(2) To permit flexibility in the distribution of property and
avoid joint interests, t.e., avoid giving the widow a half interest
in both Stock X and Stock Y To accomplish this the executor
should be authorized to select assets and make distributions in kind,
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of George L. Ford and Robert M.
Brucken, members of the Ohio Bar, in the preparation of this article.
1. Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964 INT. REV, BULL. No. 15, at 30, first published as a Technical
Information Release on March 19, 1964 [hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc. 64-19].
2. An example is a revocable inter vivos trust where property is to be allocated to a marital
deduction trust on the death of the grantor.
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such as to distribute all of the shares of one stock to the surviving
spouse and other shares to other beneficiaries.
(3) To avoid a capital gains tax. This could occur, under the
position taken by the Internal Revenue Service,' if property which
has appreciated in value from the date of death is used to satisfy a
pecuniary bequest. For example if the pecuniary bequest created
an obligation to pay $500,000 and the executor satisfied it by the
transfer of shares of Stock X which had appreciated in value, so
that only 5/8ths of the total number of shares of Stock X were
necessary to satisfy the bequest, there would be a capital gain to the
estate equal to the appreciation. One method of avoiding this un-
wanted capital gain would be to permit the executor to use values
determined for estate tax purposes in valuing property distributed
in kind to satisfy pecuniary bequests, so that the basis for tax pur-
poses of the property equals the obligation being satisfied and hence
no taxable gain results.
(4) To permit "post mortem tax planning." For example, if
the surviving spouse turns out not to need the marital deduc-
tion property or is otherwise assured of care and support, then
as a matter of tax planning it might be best that the executor
distribute to her assets which have depreciated in value, or wasting
assets, so that any estate tax upon her death would be minimized.
Thus in the above example, post mortem estate planning might in-
dicate the wisdom of distributing to the surviving spouse Stock Y
which at the date of distribution had a value of only $400,000
and distributing to the children Stock X which had appreciated in
value, thereby causing a tax free shift in growth and equities to the
next generation without, hopefully, sacrificing the immediate $500,-
000 marital deduction which is desired.
A marital deduction clause which evolved to accomplish the above four
objectives came to have the following three principal elements:
(1) A formula providing for a pecuniary amount equal to the
maximum marital deduction;
(2) Provision that the fiduciary may, or is required to, select
assets in kind to satisfy the bequest, z.e., the bequest is not solely
payable in cash; and
(3) Provision that the assets distributed in kind are to be valued
at values determined for estate tax purposes.
A commonly used pecuniary formula clause appears in Exhibit A
3. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum BULL. 325.
See also the discussion in Kohn, The Marital Deducton: When And How To Use It, 16 W
REs. L. REv. 237 (1965).
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in the appendix to this article. It will be noted that the basic clause
provides for the computation of the maximum marital deduction at values
determined for federal estate tax purposes. ThIs is merely an attempt
to gain the maximum marital deduction and is not the evil with which
the Service is concerned. The additional clause contained in item 2 of
Exhibit A provides that in making distributions the estate tax values are
to be used, as distinguished from values current at date of distribution.
It is this additional clause in the above example which would specifically
authorize the executor to distribute Stock Y to the surviving spouse, and
it is this to which the Service objects.
Valuing Property
The Service is also similarly concerned in any case in which a pecuni-
ary marital deduction clause is used and there is no direction as to the
values which the fiduciary is to use in making distribution, such as that
in item 1 of Exhibit A. In such case the Service is concerned that the
fiduciary may use estate tax values (generally date of death) for valuing
property, rather than values current at the date of distribution, with the
same result as if the instrument specifically so authorized the use of
estate tax values, as in item 2 of Exhibit A.
The reasons for the Internal Revenue Service's concern in such cases
and its issuance of Rev Proc. 64-19 are based on both technical grounds
and tax policy. The technical grounds stated in the Rev Proc. are that
"the interest in property passing from the decedent to his surviving
spouse would not be ascertainable as of the date of death, if the property
available for distribution included assets which might fluctuate in
value."4 This reason is barely persuasive or specific and it might better
be stated as encompassing various additional grounds such as that the
marital deduction is allowed only with respect to an interest which is
vested in the surviving spouse at the date of death; the marital deduc-
tion is not allowable where .the executor or trustee has power to divert
property to a person other than the surviving spouse;5 and the marital
deduction is not allowable where the interest passing from the decedent
to the surviving spouse is a "terminable interest"' - "terminable" be-
cause the fiduciary has the authority to select depreciating assets.
4. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.03, at 30-31. The question of whether the condemned clause quali-
fied for the marital deduction was earlier raised in 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 783, 815
(3d ed. 1961) The issue was raised in I.R.S. field offices and referred to the National Of-
fice on "request for technical advice" about 1961.
5. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (5) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. fl.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b) [hereinafter cited as CODE fl; Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1
(1958) The concepts with respect to "vesting," "ascertainable interests" and "terminable
interests" are discussed in the other articles in this series by Mr. Edwards and Mr. Schnell.
See also Colson, The Marital Deduction & Revenue Procedure 64-19, Prac. Law., Oct. 1964,
p. 69.
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In short, the uncertainty as to what, if anything of value may pass to
the surviving spouse under the pecuniary formula clause previously
described is regarded by the Service as justification for putting the estate
claiming the marital deduction to proof that it is entitled, under such cir-
cumstances, to the marital deduction. Since the testamentary instrument
must speak as of the date of death, the Rev. Proc. conclusively determines
that no vested interest passes to the surviving spouse and the marital
deduction is not allowable.
On policy grounds, the Service is alarmed at such post mortem tax
planning as may have the effect of transferring property free of estate or
gift tax to future generations from the surviving spouse, under a statute
which exempted the property from the husband's estate presumably be-
cause it would bear a tax on transfer from the surviving spouse. Thus
Rev. Proc. 64-19 was issued to damp down on what the Service regarded
as an abuse contrary to the intention of Congress in enacting the marital
deduction statute.
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE POSITION AS SET
FORTH IN REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
There are two aspects of the Internal Revenue Service position as
stated in Rev. Proc. 64-19 which are of overriding importance:
First. Rev. Proc. 64-19 condemns only a certain limited type of
marital deduction clause, not all marital deduction clauses.
Second. With regard to such condemned marital deduction clause,
the Rev. Proc. demes the marital deduction clause gift completely
and not just in part.
The typical marital deduction clause which is condemned by Rev.
Proc. 64-19 is a pecuniary formula clause which has the three elements
previously described.7 This is illustrated by items 1 and 2 of Exhibit A.
In short the prime element of such a clause which runs afoul of Rev.
Proc. 64-19 is that the fiduciary is required to or may use estate tax
values, without regard to values at date of distribution, in distributing
assets to satisfy the bequest to the surviving spouse under a pecuniary
formula or non-formula clause.
Situations to Which Revenue Procedure 64-19 Does Not Apply
It is equally important to be aware of marital deduction situations
to which Rev. Proc. 64-19 does not apply. These are:
(1) A bequest solely in cash.8
7. See p. 259 supra.
8. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3) (a), at 30, 32.
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(2) A bequest of specific property.' Rev Proc. 64-19 should also
have no application to a bequest of a class of property, for example,
"all of my real estate."
(3) A fractional share bequest.'" A fractional share bequest is
illustrated in Exhibit B in the appendix to this article. Rev Proc.
64-19 specifically provides that it is not applicable to "a bequest
or transfer in trust of a fractional share of the estate, under which
each beneficiary shares proportionately in the appreciation or de-
preciation of the value of assets to the date, or dates, of distribu-
tion."
11
(4) A pecumary bequest where under the state law or provisions
of the instrument it is clear that the fiduciary must distribute assets,
including cash, fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation
in the value of all property available for distribution. 2 Rev Proc.
64-19 does not apply to such a marital deduction situation because,
of course, the Rev Proc. is directed to a situation where the surviv-
ing spouse would not fairly share in the appreciation or depreciation
in property available for distribution. An example of a marital
deduction provision of the type thus excepted from Rev Proc. 64-19
is found in Exhibit A with clauses 1 and 4.
(5) A pecuniary bequest where under state law or provisions of
the instrument it is clear that the fiduciary must distribute assets,
including cash, having an aggregate fair market value at the date or
dates of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of the
pecuniary bequest as determined for federal estate tax purposes.' 3
This type of marital deduction situation is excepted from Rev Proc.
64-19 because the surviving spouse will generally obtain no less
than the dollar amount of the pecuniary bequest as determined for
federal estate tax purposes. Thus even though the surviving spouse
does not share in appreciation, the surviving spouse in such case is
not subject to depreciaton of the value of her bequest. An ex-
ample of a marital deduction clause of this type is found in Exhibit
A by combining items 1 and 5.
(6) A bequest where any one or more of the elements of the
condemned pecuniary formula clause is absent. These elements are
the ones previously referred to. 4 An example is a pecumary be-
quest where under the state law or provisions of the instrument it
9. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(2), at 30, 32.
10. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01 (1), at 30, 32.
Ii. Ibut.
12. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, at 30, 31.
13. ibid.
14. See p. 259 supra; see also Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01 (3) (b), at 30, 32.
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is dear that assets selected by the fiduciary to be distributed in kind
in satisfaction of the bequest are required to be valued at their
respective values on the date, or dates, of their distribution. 5
Situations to Which Revenue Procedure 64-19 is Directed
The above exceptions to the application of Rev. Proc. 64-19 indicate
that a careful reading of the Rev Proc. is necessary and that it is not
applicable to all marital deduction clauses. The danger, however, in
the present situation is that some Service personnel and counsel may be-
come confused to the point of considering that the only marital deduc-
tion clause that may be used in the future is that which Rev Proc. 64-19
approves by including it in the agreements suggested by the Service to
overcome the defect of the condemned pecuniary formula clause. The
provision is contained in Exhibit D in the appendix to this article, and
is referred to in paragraph (4) above. There are of course many other
marital deduction clauses that may be used and which will continue to
qualify for the marital deduction. These will be discussed later.
Another danger is that Service personnel will fail to distinguish be-
tween the various marital deduction clauses and require the agreements
provided under Rev Proc. 64-19 to be executed in all cases even though
the particular instrument does not run afoul of Rev. Proc. 64-19 As
will be seen later, the fiduciary has an obligation to determine the ap-
plicability of the Rev. Proc. and whether such an agreement should be
executed in the light of all the circumstances, particularly the intent of
the testator. Rev Proc. 64-19 certainly does not require all marital
deduction clauses to conform to a particular pattern; it merely condemns
a clause which requires or may permit an unfair selection of assets by
the fiduciary against the surviving spouse.
Having determined the limited type of situation to which Rev. Proc.
64-19 is directed, it should be emphasized that in such a situation, it is
the Service position that no marital deduction is permitted under such a
clause even though in fact there is a distribution of assets to the surviving
spouse. For instance, in the example stated at the outset of this article, 6
if the fiduciary distributed Stock Y to the surviving spouse and Stock X
to the other beneficiaries under a pecuniary formula marital deduction
clause, permitting the fiduciary to select assets for distribution at values
based upon estate tax values, the Service would disallow -the marital
deduction completely even though in fact the surviving spouse received
Stock Y which at the date of distribution had a value of $400,000. The
position of the Service would be that as of the date of death the interest
in property passing to the surviving spouse was not ascertainable. It
15. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(3) (c), at 30, 32.
16. See p. 258 supra.
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should be pointed out, of course, that if the same instrument contained
a cash bequest to the surviving spouse or a devise of the decedent's resi-
dence to the surviving spouse, such cash bequest or bequest of specific
property would qualify for the marital deduction, unaffected by any
defect that would exist by reason of the pecuniary formula marital deduc-
tion clause.
The Internal Revenue Service, having thus stated its position in Rev.
Proc. 64-19, at the same time recognized that it could be creating a
hardship and condemning a marital deduction clause that may have been
innocently used on a wide spread basis. Accordingly, Rev Proc. 64-19
contains its own escape clause offering an opportunity to limit its retro-
active effect. It provides that where the Rev Proc. would otherwise be
applicable, the marital deduction will nevertheless be allowed if the fi-
duciary and the surviving spouse executed agreements to the effect that
the assets of the estate available for distribution will be so distributed
that the cash and other property distributed in satisfaction of the marital
deduction bequest will be fairly representative of the net appreciation
or depreciation in the value of the available property on the date or
dates of distribution. 7 These agreements appear in Exhibits C and D in
the appendix to this article. The wisdom of signing these agreements
will be discussed later. It is clear, however, that it is the position of the
Internal Revenue Service that if the pecuniary formula marital deduction
clause is of the condemned type under Rev Proc. 64-19 and if the agree-
ment is not filed with the Internal Revenue Service, the marital deduction
will be disallowed.
It should be emphasized that with respect to instruments executed
on or after October 1, 1964 the option of filing the above agreements
is not available; in such cases it is the position of the Service that the
instruments must comply with Rev Proc. 64-19 or the formula clause
marital deduction will be disallowed.
Anyone refusing to recognize Rev Proc. 64-19 or to comply there-
with in drafting marital deduction clauses does so, of course, at his own
risk. While it is impossible to point to a specific provision of the statute
and regulations directly upholding the Service's position, the technical
grounds of the Service position must be recognized. The weakness in
the Service position, however, is that it is based on a refusal to recognize
the fiduciary's duty of impartiality. In short, the Service in Rev Proc.
64-19 has expressed its suspicion that where the state law or the instru-
ment is not clear on the point, the fiduciary is likely to engage in post
mortem tax planning so as to "unfairly" allocate assets between the sur-
viving spouse and other beneficiaries with the view of minimizing the
second estate tax upon the death of the surviving spouse. This view,
17 Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01, at 30, 31; see §§ 5.01-.02, at 30, 32-33.
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that the fiduciary will not act fairly among the distributees is not of
course in accordance with the general concept of the fiduciary's responsi-
bility as a trustee."8 As one writer " points out in a subsequent article
in this Symposium, cases in which it appears the Service would apply
Rev. Proc. 64-19 have been construed by the state courts as requiring a
duty of fairness in distribution on the part of the fiduciary.
The Service, however, has had a long history of looking at state
court decisions with a jaundiced eye and having the natural suspicion of
the tax administrator that the parties may arrange their affairs for the
maximum tax advantage regardless of general concepts under state law.2"
Of course, the literature with respect to post mortem tax planning has
helped to fan the Service suspicion in this area. Moreover, the Service
can argue that each case must stand on its own, because in any state
court proceeding the principal issue must be the intent of the particular
testator, and therefore the Service cannot be bound by general principles
of trust law but must look to the particular facts and circumstances per-
tinent to each estate.
Rev. Proc. 64-19 is the Service's attempt, through a warning for the
future and an adminstrative procedure of agreements with respect to
past transactions, to ward off controversy and litigation with unfortunate
results to the taxpayers. However, the position of the Service is being
litigated in the Tax Court in Estate of Daniel J Walsh.2 Whether this
case will result in new light or more confusion under Rev. Proc. 64-19
remains to be seen and is hardly a subject of worthwhile speculation at
this time.
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE STEPS TO BE TAKEN
IN LIGHT OF REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
The question of what to do in the light of Rev Proc. 64-19 may
arise in three different situations, each of which presents its own con-
siderations.
First. Where the problem is presently at hand, i.e., there is pres-
ently an estate or for other reasons the die is cast in the form
of an instrument containing a condemned pecuniary formula marital
deduction clause, such as one that cannot be amended.
Second. Where there is an instrument presently in effect which
may be defective under Rev Proc. 64-19 but it can be amended or
rewritten.
18. See 2 ScoTr, TRusTs §§ 183, 187 (2d ed. 1956).
19. Butala, Admtnsstratve Problems Involvsng Martal Deduction Gifts, 16 W RES. L. REV.
290 (1965).
20. Generally, the I.R.S. is reluctant to accept state court decisions unless rendered in adver-
sary proceedings. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1958).
21. No. 3433-63, T.C., July 16, 1963.
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Thzrd. Where a new instrument is to be drawn and the question
is what clause should be used to obtain a marital deduction in view
of Rev Proc. 64-19
These three situations will now be considered.
Problem Presently at Hand
The first consideration, where the problem is presently at hand, is
whether the agreements provided under Rev Proc. 64-19 should be
filed.
Should the agreement be signed. Tax constderattns.-From a tax
viewpoint the principal reason for filing the agreements which are pro-
vided under the Rev Proc. is to assure the allowance of a marital deduc-
tion. On the other hand, it should be recognized that, if the surviving
spouse files the agreement and upon a subsequent audit it is determined
that she did not receive cash or other property in satisfaction of the be-
quest which was fairly representative of her proportionate share of ap-
preciation in value of the property to the date or dates of distribution, the
Service may take the position that she made a gift to the other benefici-
aries or heirs with respect to the value which the Service claims she
should have received but did not. The gift tax may be a serious problem
depending upon the size of the estate involved; and a gift tax imposed
upon the surviving spouse with the full benefits of the gift tax exemption
and exclusions may not be a very high price to pay for the full allowance
of the marital deduction in the estate of her husband.'
Furthermore, income taxes cannot be ignored in considering whether
to file the agreement prescribed by Rev Proc. 64-19 Under the agree-
ment, the surviving spouse must receive her share of the assets which
may result in her receiving assets productive of income, and hence incur
income taxes, which the parties might otherwise desire to minimize by
the allocation of such assets to other beneficiaries. Rev Proc. 64-19 is
silent on this matter. In fact, the Rev Proc. states that it does not relate
to any issue arising under the income tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.2" It would appear that Rev Proc. 64-19 is directed only
to an allocation of assets fairly among the beneficiaries based upon value
at the date of distribution and the fact that one asset may be productive
22. In this respect, it should be pointed out that Rev. Proc. 64-19 does not prohibit post
mortem tax planning. The net effect of the application of the agreements provided under the
Rev. Proc. may be the same as a fractional share marital deduction bequest with a gift by the
surviving spouse of part of her interest in order to reduce future estate taxes. It is noted that
Rev. Proc. 64-19 does not apply the strict rule of Code § 2056(d) which disallows the marital
deduction for an interest disclaimed by the surviving spouse. Cf. Issac Harter, 39 T.C. 511
(1962), acq., 1963 INT. REV. BULL No. 34, at 6, where the marital deduction was allowed
regardless of gifts by the surviving spouse.
23. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.02, at 30, 32.
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of more income than another would not prevent the fiducAary from
making a selection based upon future income being received by one
beneficiary rather than another, so long as at the date of distribution the
values were fairly represented. On the other hand, the caveat in Rev.
Proc. 64-19 may indicate that the Service is engaging in watchful wait-
ing to see whether any income tax abuses arise requiring it to make a
further announcement.
Fiductary's authorty.-A fundamental question which the fiduciary
must decide is whether execution of the agreement provided by Rev.
Proc. 64-19 is within the fiduciary's authority. Here the fiduciary faces
the peculiar problem that if the intention of the testator or the state law
is clear that the surviving spouse is to share in the appreciation or de-
preciation under the marital deduction formula bequest, then, by the
terms of Rev Proc. 64-19 the agreement is not necessary; but if the
Service insists on it, the executor could hardly complain on grounds of
lack of authority.24 On the other hand, if the instrument is not dear
and the state law in such case does not supply a dear answer excepting
the instrument from Rev. Proc. 64-19, or if in fact the instrument is
reasonably clear that the fiduciary is to make distributions in a manner
condemned under Rev. Proc. 64-19, the agreements are then necessary
to obtain the marital deduction; but in such a case the executor may be
called upon to sign an agreement which may not dearly reflect the in-
tent of the testator. The fiduciary must therefore decide whether the
overriding intent of the testator was to obtain the marital deduction or
whether his intent, regardless of the marital deduction consequences, was
to limit the property to be distributed to the surviving spouse.
In such cases, if the agreement is not necessary there is likely to be
no problem of lack of authority; but if the agreement is necessary- this
very fact alone may raise the question of lack of authority. It is at this
point that some authorities feel the fiduciary is skating on thin ice if he
acts without court approval.2"
The problem may be complicated by disagreements among the bene-
ficiaries. It is conceivable that the surviving spouse may refuse to sign
the agreement provided under Rev Proc. 64-19 and insist upon a distri-
bution of property to her without regard to questions being raised by the
Service as to the marital deduction. In such a case the burden of the loss
of the marital deduction could substantially wipe out the interest of other
beneficiaries - which of course may be the very reason a spiteful spouse
might refuse to sign the agreement.
24. The fiduciary may have other reasons for refusing to sign an unnecessary agreement,
including the added costs and problems in adminmstration that may result as discussed later
herein.
25. Iauritzen, The Marital Deduction, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 318 (1964).
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Admimstrative problems.-The decision to sign the agreements can
hardly be made without knowing what they mean. At this stage their
effect in administration is not clear, but that they will have some effect
is certain.
In the first place, the agreements to be signed by the fiduciary and
by the surviving spouse both clearly contemplate reporting to the Internal
Revenue Service as to the operations of the estate. This is bound to add
to the burdens of administration. Moreover, the application of the agree-
ments involves matters of judgment as to valuations, including valuations
at the time of various distributions. Thus not only must the value of
assets included in the gross estate be determined as of the date of death,
as in the normal case, but estate tax problems will be multiplied many
fold by reason of the fact that a valuation will be necessary every time
there is a distribution. The fiduciary is subject to being second guessed
by Service representatives as to the values at the time of distribution,
with resulting important and unpleasant tax consequences.
Moreover, the marital deduction clause provided under the agree-
ments, under which the surviving spouse is entitled to her share of ap-
preciation or depreciation, is not necessarily the clause which is most de-
sired. The agreements result in the Treasury fixing the form of the
marital deduction bequest. There are several other forms for marital
deduction bequests, described later, which may be preferable both as to
the surviving spouse's share and in administration. If the instrument can
be construed as encompassing one of the other types of bequests this
may be preferable to signing the agreement.
Timing" When should the agreement be filed?-Rev Proc. 64-19
is silent on the point of when the agreements are to be filed. Where
there is already a present estate, there may have been distributions prior
to the earliest date the agreements under the Rev Proc. could be filed.
It is not clear what effect the Rev Proc. and the agreements have where
distributions have previously been made, including situations where the
surviving spouse did not share in appreciation in prior distributions. The
Rev Proc. is, however, open enough to permit this to be corrected by
subsequent distributions. For example, assume the adjusted gross estate
is $1,000,000 at date of death, the widow and a son are each entitled to
fifty per cent, and $700,000 of assets are distributed to the son at a time
when the estate assets have appreciated to $2,000,000 in value. What
distribution is to be made to the surviving spouse after the filing of the
agreement and upon ultimate distribution of the estate? If on the date
of ultimate distribution the estate assets have shrunk from $1,300,000
(the balance after the distribution to the son) to $800,000, the surviving
spouse would be entitled to 10/13 ($1,000,000/$1,300,000) of the
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$800,000 or $615,000 and the son would be entitled to 3/13 of $800,-
000 or $185,000.
Since Rev Proc. 64-19 is silent as to the date the agreements must
be filed, presumably decisions as to whether and when they should be
filed can be delayed until the earlier of (a) the Service is insistent on it,
with disallowance of the marital deduction as the penalty for failure to
file or (b) distributions are about to be made of such a substantial part
of the estate that the Service may not accept the agreements if filed
after such distributions, on the ground that the agreements would have
no substantial application.26
Alternatmes.-This points up the alternatives that may be available
to the filing of the agreements. One alternative is to do nothing until
the last minute - waiting for a reversal of the Service position either
through litigation or legislation. Litigation may be of doubtful help not
only because of the long time that may be involved before an appellate
court decision could be obtained but also because of distinguishing fea-
tures that each case may have. While legislation at the federal level
is unlikely, it is possible that some states may adopt legislation which will
have the effect of clarifying the state law so that current values must be
used in making distributions under clauses otherwise condemned by Rev
Proc. 64-19.27 This may be the surest and shortest route to a solution.
26. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01, at 30, 31, and the agreement to be executed by the Fiduciary
(Exhibit D at the end of this aricle) both contemplate application to future distributions.
On the other hand, if in fact distributions have been made as so contemplated, the agree-
ments may not be necessary but should be accepted by I.R.S. as a basis for closing the. case.
27. Mississippi recently adopted the following provision:
That whenever under any last will and testament the executor or other fiduciary,
is required to, or has an option to, satisfy a pecuniary bequest to the surviving spouse
of the testator, or to a trust for the benefit of a surviving spouse, by a transfer of
assets of the estate in kind at values determined for federal estate tax purposes, the
executor or other fiduciary shall be required to satisfy such pecuniary bequest by
the distribution to the surviving spouse or trustee of either:
1) Assets having an aggregate fair market value, on the dates of distribution,
not less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust as finally de-
termined for federal estate tax purposes, or
2) assets fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of
all property available for distribution in satisfaction of the pecuniary bequest or
transfer.
Agreement as to distribution of assets. - That the executor, trustee, or other fi-
duciary having discretionary powers under a last will and testament or transfer in
trust shall be authorized to enter into agreements with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue of the United States of America, and other taxing authorities, to exercise
the fiduciary's discretion so that the assets to be distributed in satisfaction of a be-
quest or transfer in trust will be selected in such a manner that cash and other
properties distributed will have an aggregate fair market value representative of
the pecuniary legatee's or transferee's proportionate share of the appreciation or de-
preciation in value to the date, or dates, of distribution of all property then available
for distribution in satisfaction of such bequest or transfer. It being the purpose of
this act to authorize such fiduciary to enter into any agreement that may be neces-
sary or advisable in order to secure for Federal estate tax purposes the maximum
marital deduction available under the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States
of America and to do and perform all acts incident to such purpose. Miss. Laws
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A second alternative is to obtain a state court determination specifical-
ly construing the marital deduction clause so that its terms do not have a
meaning falling within the condemnation of Rev Proc. 64-19 This
may be a determination, for example, that the fiduciary in order to ia-
plement the bequest to the surviving spouse must distribute assets, in-
cluding cash, having an aggregate fair market value at the date or dates
of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of the pecuniary
bequest or transfer as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes.
This would have the effect of construing the will as having substantially
the meaning of the clause contained in item 5 of Exhibit A."8 Whether
the instrument is given this construction, or some other construction
which qualifies for the marital deduction and falls outside the adverse
rule of the Rev Proc. is not important since the construction determina-
non would have the same effect; the important point for this purpose is
that the instrument be construed under the state law so that the marital
deduction clause is excepted from Rev Proc. 64-19
It is not likely that the Service would contest the validity or applica-
bility of a state court decision of this type, assuming it is honored in the
actual administration of the estate by the fiduciary. This is because
Rev Proc. 64-19 itself declares the marital deduction is not to be denied
where the duty of the fiduciary under the applicable state law is dearly
of a type excepted from the adverse rule of the Rev Proc. Moreover,
the Service can hardly complain of a state court construction clarifying
a marital deduction clause by agreement when the Rev Proc. itself pro-
vides for an agreement as the effective corrective device.
There is an Instrument Presently in Effect Which May be Defective
Under Revenue Procedure 64-19, But it Can be Amended or Rewritten
A second situation in which the question arises as to what to do
about Rev Proc. 64-19 is where the die is not yet cast but may be unless
the attorney takes steps to amend or rewrite an existing instrument. In
this situation a course of "wait and see" may be adopted but is more
dangerous. As previously pointed out, counsel may choose presently to
do nothing on the ground that a reversal of Rev Proc. 64-19, by litiga-
tion or legislation, may be forthcoming or on the ground that at the
appropriate tune, if necessary, a favorable construction excepting the
instrument from Rev Proc. 64-19 can be obtained in the state court.
The risks in such inaction are obvious; for events, such as the client's
death or incompetency, may freeze the situation without choice. How-
ever, there is the question whether the lawyer has an obligation to review
1964, S.B. 2059 (effective June 5, 1964). However, the Service has indicated that
the legislation will not accomplish its purpose because it is in the alternative and
gives the fiduciary an opportunity for post mortem tax planning.
28. See Appendix at p. 277 mfra.
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all testamentary instruments he previously drafted and has the right to
notify all persons for whom he drafted such instruments, with the view
of possibly amending or rewriting the instruments, if necessary, in the
light of Rev. Proc. 64-19 This could impose a tremendous workload on
some lawyers. It also involves the practical problem of being able to
be paid for reviewing and rewriting an instrument already in effect. For
the most part however the problem is similar to and can be resolved in
the same way as the problem which arose in 1948 when the marital de-
duction statute was enacted and lawyers were faced with the fact that
instruments they had previously written may or may not have provided
for the benefits of the marital deduction.
A note of caution must be expressed with regard to the execution of
a codicil or trust amendment. For example, a codicil of course could
take the form of completely rewriting the marital deduction clause or
other parts of the instrument or could take the form of a simple amend-
ment which would add a clause to the effect that the instrument is to
be construed so as to limit the fiduciary's discretion in such respects as is
necessary to qualify for the marital deduction. Such a codicil is likely
to be a makeshift, however, and certainly a re-examination of the entire
instrument and rewritng of the basic clauses would be advisable. The
type of marital deduction clauses that may be used for the future, in the
light of Rev. Proc. 64-19, is discussed later.
However, attention should be called to the fact that amending an
instrument or executing a codicil merely to authorize the executor or
fiduciary to execute the agreement provided for under Rev. Proc. 64-19
is not likely to be helpful and may be dangerous. The agreement pro-
vided in Rev. Proc. 64-19 may be filed only in the case of instruments
executed before October 1, 1964. If a person has a will with a possibly
defective marital deduction clause under Rev Proc. 64-19 which was
executed before October 1, 1964 - will the execution of a codicil on or
after October 1, 1964 make the instrument one which is no longer
susceptible of being cured by an agreement under Rev. Proc. 64-19)
It is believed that it was not the intention of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice so to trick anyone into losing his right to execute an agreement
under Rev Proc. 64-19 with respect to a will executed prior to October
1, 1964. However, one author has pointed out that a codicil executed
after October 1, 1964 may have just such an effect.29
A New Instrument %s to be Drawn and the Question is What Clause Should
be Used to Obtain a Marital Deduction %n View of Revenue Procedure 64-19
The final question is what type of marital deduction clause should
29. See Hauser, Latest Developments ,n Taxation of Estates and Trusts Raise New Caveats
for Tax Men, 21 J. TAXATION 32, 33 (1964).
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be used in drafting instruments in the future. As previously stated Rev
Proc. 64-19 is directed to one type of marital deduction clause in a fairly
limited situation. It still leaves available the use of other types of mari-
tal deduction clauses.
Basically, Rev Proc. 64-19 still leaves available and requires in turn
a choice between two kinds of marital deduction formula clauses: (1) A
fractional share and (2) a pecuniary gift of a type other than that con-
demned by Rev Proc. 64-19. There are variations of clauses falling in
these two categories; but Rev Proc. 64-19 in effect requires the use of
a clause in one of these two, as distinguished from a third type previously
used, namely a pecuniary formula clause with the bequest to be satisfied
with assets valued at estate tax values. Following are types of marital
deduction clauses which continue to qualify for the marital deduction and
are excepted from Rev Proc. 64-19
Fractional share.-An example of a formula fractional share bequest
is contained in Exhibit B."0 The basic concept of this clause is to
give to the surviving spouse a fraction of the residuary estate, which
fraction represents the maximum estate tax marital deduction. In a true
fractional share bequest the surviving spouse will be entitled to a fraction
of each asset; but as illustrated in item 2 in Exhibit B, the executor
may be authorized to allocate and distribute specific properties rather
than undivided interests, using for this purpose current values at the date
of distribution.
The fractional share bequest is specifically excepted from the adverse
rule of Rev Proc. 64-19 "
In its application, the true fractional share clause will avoid the
capital gains problem that exists in the satisfaction of a pecuniary be-
quest. 2 This type of clause also automatically provides for the equitable
sharing of appreciation and depreciation in accordance with the concept
under Rev Proc. 64-19. This of course may be an advantage or disad-
vantage to the parties, depending upon their desire to have the surviving
spouse's interest fluctuate with appreciation or depreciation or to be fixed,
and the clause should be used with this result in mind.
As previously indicated the clause may be drawn so as to result in a
joint ownership of assets or division of assets, and again the draftsman
must keep in mind this result in determining the form of the fractional
share clause.
Pecuniary formula; amount determined by estate tax values and satis-
fied with assets valued at distribution date.-An example of this type of
30. See Appendix at p. 278 fnfra.
31. Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01(1), at 30, 32.
32. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
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pecuniary formula marital deduction clause is found in Exhibit A with
the use of the clause in item 3.33" The prmcApal point of this type of a
marital deduction clause is that it does provide for a pecuniary formula
(dollar amount determined under a formula), as distinguished from a
fractional share; but the bequest is to be satisfied with assets valued at
the distribution date. It is this latter requirement which particularly
takes this clause out of the adverse rule provided under Rev Proc.
64-19.
4
In the application of this particular pecuniary formula clause, the
widow is entitled to a fixed dollar amount and increases or losses in value
are shifted to other beneficiaries. This clause does have the disadvantage
that capital gains may result upon the satisfaction of the dollar bequest
with appreciated assets;35 but on the other hand capital losses could also
result.
A principal advantage of this form of marital deduction clause is that
it does permit flexibility in the selection of assets by the fiduciary. By
the same token it requires a valuation of assets at the time of distribu-
tion. While this generally has not been a tax problem in the past, the
publication of Rev. Proc. 64-19 may cause Service personnel to scrutinize
the values used more closely for gift tax possibilities.
This pecuniary formula marital deduction clause illustrates, as does
the prior fractional share clause, that different consequences flow with
respect to the surviving spouse and other beneficiaries depending upon
the particular clause used. Thus Rev. Proc. 64-19 may serve the bene-
ficial purpose of calling attention to the fact that different clauses give
different property results and, therefore, that more attention at the draft-
ing stage should be given to determining what the testator really intends
the surviving spouse to receive.
Pecuniary formula; amount determined by estate tax values, with
sharing of appreciation to date of distribution.-This type of pecuniary
formula marital deduction clause is illustrated in Exhibit A with the
clause contained in item 4.3" In essence this is a type of marital deduction
clause which is particularly approved by Rev. Proc. 64-19, it being the
type of clause which would result from the agreement to be signed by the
fiduciary as provided under the Rev Proc.3 7
In some respects this clause is merely a variation of the fractional
share clause previously described above. It is dear, however, that under
this clause a selection of assets is permitted and there is no requirement
33. See Appendix at p. 276 snfra.
34. Rev. Proc. 64-19, §§ 2.02, 4.01(3) (c), at 30-32.
35. See authorities cated note 3 supra.
36. See Appendix at p. 277 snfra.
37. See Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02, at 30, 31; the Agreement in Exhibit D at p. 279 snfra.
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of distribution of a prorata portion of each asset. This clause also re-
quires a revaluation of assets at the time of distribution in order to deter-
mine that there is a proper sharing of appreciation and depreciation. In
short this clause authorizes the fiduciary to select assets and thereby per-
mits flexibility in such selection but not a preference among the benefi-
ciaries with reference to values at the time of distribution.
Since this clause is basically the same as that provided for under the
agreement prescribed in Rev Proc. 64-19, it would be well to evaluate
the use of this particular clause. The advantages of the clause with
respect to flexibility and selection of assets have already been described.
However, there are certain problems dependent upon the use of this
clause which should be recognized. One problem is that the sharing of
appreciation or depreciation must be kept in mind every time any distri-
bution is made from the estate. Assume that the ratio determined by
federal estate tax values between the marital deduction bequest and the
balance of the estate, the non-marital portion, is forty to sixty per cent.
Assume that the executor desires to make a distribution of $100,000 and
the estate at the date of death has a value of $1,000,000 but at the date
of distribution has a value of $1,100,000. In determining the distribu-
tion to be made at that time, will the executor have to distribute assets
having a value of $110,000? Will the executor have to distribute forty
per cent to the surviving spouse? Must the executor include appreciated
assets in the distribution? If so, is not the fiduciary's discretion seriously
and perhaps arbitrarily limited? While these problems may be avoided
by having no interim or piece-meal distributions, is this desirable?
This clause may also open up new areas of controversy. One is that
each time a distribution to the surviving spouse is made it will be neces-
sary to revalue the assets of the entire estate; this may result in values
with which the Service will not agree. Moreover, consider the effect of
the timing of payments and the selection of assets to meet expenses or
obligations. If appreciated assets are used to pay debts and expenses, the
surviving spouse may obtain no appreciation in the remaining assets; or
if depreciated assets are used to pay debts and expenses and the distribu-
tion is thereafter made to the surviving spouse, she may obtain a higher
percentage of the remaining assets.
Administrative problems and methods of solving them are discussed
in a subsequent article in this Symposium.8 Suffice it to say, this pecu-
niary formula clause, although given prominence by Rev Proc. 64-19,
is still somewhat of an unknown quantity.
Pecuniary formula; amount determined by estate tax values and satis-
fied with assets valued at estate tax values but having total value at dis-
38. See Butala, supra note 19.
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tribution not less than the amount of the marital deduction allowed for
the gift.-This type of pecuniary formula marital deduction clause is il-
lustrated in Exhibit A by the clause provided in item 5.
This type of marital deduction clause is excepted from the adverse
rule under Rev Proc. 64-19"° because it is dear that the surviving spouse
will generally receive assets having an aggregate fair market value at the
date or dates of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of
the pecuniary bequest.
This type of marital deduction clause is a variation of that previously
set forth with the key fact being that the marital deduction, even though
the amount is determined by estate tax values, is satisfied with assets
valued, in the aggregate, at the distribution date. The difference in this
particular clause is that the individual assets so used to satisfy the bequest
are valued at estate tax values. The effect of the clause is that the widow
receives an amount not less than the marital deduction pecuniary gift, but
it may be more if the fiduciary distributes appreciated assets to her.
One advantage of this type of clause is that normally assets can be
selected so that there should be no capital gain on satisfaction of the be-
quest, but there can be a capital loss depending on the assets selected.41
In short this method permits the selection of assets having total values at
distribution not less than estate tax values, and therefore it permits the
executor to distribute to the surviving spouse assets with the least amount
of appreciation, retaining other assets with growth possibilities for other
beneficiaries.4
SUMMARY
Rev Proc. 64-19 represents a fair solution, from the Internal Reve-
nue Service viewpoint, to a difficult problem. It seemingly permits ad-
mmistrative relief where otherwise hardship could result from the loss
of the marital deduction under an apparently widely used clause. How-
ever in individual cases it will'be necessary for the lawyer to tread care-
fully, to determine not only the intent of the testator but to choose skill-
fully the means for giving effect to that intent.
It is perhaps significant that in the more than sixteen years the mari-
tal deduction has been on the statute books, the interpretation reflected in
Rev Proc. 64-19 represents the first major upheaval in the application
of the law. The long period without major problems is a tribute to the
39. Rev. Proc. 64-19, S 2.02, at 30, 31.
40. See p. 273 supra.
41. See authorities cited at note 3 supra.
42. For a discussion of other varieties of marital deduction clauses permitted since Rev. Proc.
64-19, see Stevens, How to Draft Marital Deduction Formula Clauses Under New Rev. Proc.
64-19, 20 J. TAXATION 352 (1964).
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seeming clarity of the statute and its administration. Does Rev. Proc.
64-19 herald the beginning of a new period of scrutiny by the Internal




1. Basic pecuniary formula language.
If my wife survives me, I give to the following:
An amount equal to the maximum estate tax marital deduction
(allowable in determimng the federal estate tax payable by
reason of my death) minus the value for federal estate tax pur-
poses of all items in my gross estate for federal estate tax pur-
poses which qualify for said deduction and which pass or have
passed in a form which qualifies for the estate tax marital deduc-
tion from me to my said wife (the words "pass or have passed"
shall have the same meaning as such words shall have under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the tune of
my death) under other provisions of this will, by right of survi-
vorship with respect to jointly owned property, under settlement
arrangements relating to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise
than under this pecuniary bequest. In making the computations
necessary to determine the amount of this pecuniary estate tax
marital deduction gift, values as finally determined for federal
estate tax purposes shall control.43
2. Proscribed clause.
Add to the basic paragraph in 1 above the following sentence:
The payment of this amount may be made wholly or partly in
kind by transferring to specific securities or other personal
property at values which are the same as the basis of such prop-
erty in the decedent's estate.44
3. Clause for gift satisfied with assets valued at distribution date.
Add to the basic paragraph in I above, the following sentence:
The payment of this amount may be made wholly or partly in
43. CAsNER, ESTATE PLANNING 305 (Supp. 1964) (published by Little, Brown and Com-
pany, Boston, Massachusetts)
44. This sentence is set forth in 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 815 (3d ed. 1961), as an
example of a clause authorizing the fiduciary to satisfy a pecuniary gift by a distribution in
kind valuing the distributed property at estate tax values. Professor Casner did not recom-
mend that this sentence be used.
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kind by transferring to specific securities or other personal
property at values current at the date of distribution 5
4. Clauses for gift with sharing of appreciation and depreciation to date
of distribution.
Add to the basic paragraph in I above, the additional sentence sug-
gested in 2 above plus the following sentence:
The assets to be distributed in satisfaction of this bequest will be
selected in such manner that cash and other property distributed
will have an aggregate fair market value fairly representative of
the distributee's proportionate share of the appreciation or de-
preciation in the value to the date, or dates, of distribution of all
property then available for distribution."
5. Clauses for gift satisfied with assets valued at estate tax values but
having total value at distribution not less than the amount of the
marital deduction allowed for the gift.
Add to the basic paragraph in 1 above, the additional sentence sug-
gested in 2 above plus the following sentence:
Such assets must have an aggregate fair market value at the date,
or dates, of distribution amounting to no less than the amount of
this pecunary estate tax marital deduction gift as determined
above; provided, in all other respects my Executor shall have
absolute discretion as to which assets of my estate shall be dis-




1. Basic fractional share formula language.
If my said wife survives me, I give to the following described
fractional share of my residuary estate:
The numerator of the fraction shall be the maximum estate tax
marital deduction (allowable in determining the federal estate
tax payable by reason of my death) minus the value for federal
45. This clause is recommended in 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 815, to avoid the
problem raised by the language in the sentence accompanying note 44 supra.
46. This substantially tracks the clause contained in the agreement to be executed by the
executor or trustee as prescribed in Rev. Proc. 64-19. See Exhibit D. at p. 279 mnfra.
47. The first part of this sentence substantially tracks the language in Rev. Proc. 64-19, §
2.02, first sentence, which describes a clause excepted from the adverse ruling under the Rev.
Proc.; the second part may be necessary under state law to negate any duty of the fiduciary
to distribute to the widow assets fairly representative of appreciation or deprecation in the
value of all property available for distribution.
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estate tax purposes of all items in my gross estate which qualify
for said deduction and which pass or have passed in a form which
qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction from me to my said
wife (the words "pass or have passed" shall have the same mean-
ing as such words shall have under the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code in effect at the time of my death) under other
provisions of this will, by right of survivorship with respect to
jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements relating
to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under this fractional
share gift of my residuary estate (in computing the numerator,
the values as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes
shall control), and the denominator of the fraction shall be the
value of my residuary estate (the value of my residuary estate
shall be determined on the basis of the values as finally deter-
mined for federal estate tax purposes) "
2. Clause authorizing non-pro rata distributions in kind.
Include in the powers of Executor the following language:
My Executor shall have the power, when paying legacies or di-
viding or distributing my estate, to make such payments, division
or distribution wholly or partly in kind by allotting and trans-
ferring specific securities or other personal or real property or
undivided interests therein as a part or the whole of any one or
more payments or shares at current values.49
Exhibit C
FORM OF AGREEMENT TO BE EXECUTED BY SURVIVING SPOUSE
PURSUANT TO REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
In the event of the allowance by or on behalf of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue of a marital deduction for a pecuniary bequest or trans-
fer in trust to me or on my behalf of $ --------- claimed in con-
nection with the settlement of the Federal estate tax liability of the estate
of ---------------- , and as part of the consideration for this settle-
ment, I hereby agree that in the event cash and other property accepted
in full satisfaction of this bequest or transfer in trust is not fairly repre-
sentative of my proportionate share of any net appreciation in the value,
to the date or dates of distribution, of all property then available for dis-
tribution in satisfaction of such pecunary bequest or transfer, the differ-
ence in value will be treated as a transfer or transfers by gift as of the
48. CASNER, op. cit. supra note 43, at 308.
49. See 1 CASNER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 1285. This clause is similar to the clause recom-
mended by Professor Casner at p. 815 of his work. See paragraph 3 of Exhibit A at p. 276 supra.
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date, or dates, of distribution, and a Federal gift tax return or returns with
respect to such transfer or transfers by gift will be filed if required under




FORM OF AGREEMENT TO BE EXECUTED BY EXECUTOR
OR TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
In the event of the allowance by or on behalf of the Comnissioner of
Internal Revenue of a marital deduction for a pecuniary bequest or trans-
fer in trust of $ -------- claimed in connection with the settlement
of the Federal estate tax liability of the estate of----------------
and as part of the consideration for this settlement, I hereby agree that the
assets to be distributed in satisfaction of this bequest or transfer in trust
will be selected in such manner that the cash and other property distri-
buted will have an aggregate fair market value fairly representative of
the pecuniary legatee's (or transferee's) proportionate share of the ap-
preciation or depreciation in the value to the date, or dates, of distribu-
tion of all property then available for distribution in satisfaction of such
pecuniary bequest or transfer. I further agree that, within six months
after the final distribution of cash and other property in satisfaction of
the marital deduction pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust, I will file
with the District Director of Internal Revenue, at---------------
- - , a schedule showing the cash and other property distributed
in satisfaction of the marital deduction pecuniary bequest or transfer in
trust subsequent to the date of this agreement, the cash and other property
available for distribution in satisfaction of the marital deduction pecuniary
bequest or transfer at each date of distribution, and the fair market value
of each such asset at each date of distribution.
---------------------- Trustee, or
Executor of the Will of
